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What is the Supreme Court's relationship with public opinion? Barry
Friedman's answer in The Will ofthe People 1 scours some 200 years of history to provide a distinctly political view of the Court, and the story he tells
is compelling. Yet it is also incomplete. The Will of the People presents a
largely external account of the law; it sees the influence of majority will as a
force that moves outside the jurisprudence we lawyers spend so much of our
time researching, writing, and talking about. By this account, there is what
the Justices say is driving their decisionmaking-legal doctrine-and then
what, consciously or subconsciously, is really going on. As Friedman has
explained elsewhere, "The Justices don't tend to give speeches much less
write opinions saying 'we are following public opinion. "'2 Or do they?
In this symposium contribution, I contend that Friedman is right; Supreme Court decisionmaking is inextricably bound to majority will. But he
is more right than he knows, or at least more right than The Will of the

* Professor of Law, University of Richmond School of Law. My thanks to Barry
for including me in the conversation, and for starting it in the first place. Thanks also to Jim
Gibson for comments on a prior draft, and to Kevin Michel and Jennifer Sykes for excellent
research assistance.
I. BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009).
2. Kevin Russell, Ask the Author with Barry Friedman, Part I, SCOTUS BLOG (Jan.
25, 2010, 5:20 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/20 I 0/0l/ask-the-author-with-barryfriedman-part-i/ (quoting Barry Friedman). In fairness, I take Friedman's comment as a
general (and largely correct) impression of Supreme Court decisionmaking and not as a
denial that the Justices sometimes do write explicitly majoritarian opinions. In other writings, Friedman himself has recognized the doctrinal side of majority will, albiet in a limited
fashion. See Barry Friedman, Dialogue and Judicial Review, 91 MICH. L. REv. 577, 597-99
(1992) (discussing state polling in Sixth Amendment context).
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People shows. 3 In his focus on an extralegal account of Supreme Court
decisionmaking, Friedman misses the best evidence yet of the Court's majoritarian leanings: its widespread use of explicitly majoritarian doctrine.
Sometimes-not all the time or even most of the time, but sometimes-the
influence of majority will is so strong that it seeps into the legal framework
for deciding questions of constitutional law. On these occasions, the Justices do write opinions that say "we are following majority will." By and
large, the phenomenon simply has gone unnoticed. 4
My approach in this essay is as follows. First, I canvass the surprisingly large number ·of areas in which the Supreme Court uses the prevailing position of state legislatures-its proxy for the will of the people5-to
delineate the contours of constitutional law. Second, I explain why the Justices might find state counting attractive, complementing Friedman's explanation of the Court's majoritarian proclivities outside the realm of doctrine.
Finally, I use majoritarian doctrine to reinforce Friedman's nondoctrinal
claim, showing how even the Court's state counting exercises may be affected by the larger social and political currents of a given time. In the end,
Friedman is right; forces outside the law push the Court towards majoritarian outcomes. But the relationship between the Justices and the will of the
people is not just ethereal. There is a doctrinal side to the influence of majority will.

3. See supra note 2 (noting Friedman's recognition of explicitly majoritarian doctrine in other work).
4. A few scholars have recognized the Court's use of explicitly majoritarian doctrine in the substantive due process area. See infra note II and accompanying text. Otherwise, I have found just four articles on point. Two are seminal pieces, excellent although
limited in scope. See Friedman, supra note 2, at 592-607 (discussing state counting phenomenon in the context of the Supreme Court's Sixth Amendment right to jury trial jurisprudence while recognizing larger phenomenon); Steven L. Winter, Tennessee v. Gamer and the
Democratic Practice of Judicial Review, 14 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 679, 683-91
(1986) (same but focusing discussion on Fourth Amendment context). The other two are
recent works that incorporate these early insights into related discussions. See Roderick M.
Hills, Jr., Counting States, 32 HARV. J.L. & Pus. PoL'Y 17, 18 (2009) (arguing that to the
extent the Supreme Court counts states, it does so as a limit on, rather than source of, constitutionallaw and as such, is consistent with federalism principles); Note, State Law as "Other
Law": Our Fifty Sovereigns in the Federal Constitutional Canon, 120 HARV. L. REv. 1670,
1690 (2007) (comparing Court's reliance on state counting and foreign law).
5. The Supreme Court assumes that state legislative positions are an accurate reflection of majority will. See infra notes 8, 12-13, and accompanying text. Following its
lead, I make the same assumption here, although my most recent work questions whether that
is necessarily true. See Corinna Barrett Lain, An Upside-Down Theory of Judicial Review
(2011) (on file with author).
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I. STATE COUNTING AS A DOCTRINAL PHENOMENON

The most famous example of explicitly majoritarian constitutional
doctrine is in the Eighth Amendment context, where the Supreme Court has
interpreted the "cruel and unusual punishments" clause to prohibit punishments once a "national consensus" has formed against them. 6 And how is a
national consensus established? The starting point is the majority position
of state legislatures7-"[t]he clearest and most reliable ... evidence of contemporary values."8 Within the academy, conventional wisdom is that the
Eighth Amendment is the only place where the Court takes such an explicitly majoritarian approach. 9 Yet that impression is simply inaccurate. As I
6. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551,560-64,578-79 (2005) (invalidating juvenile death penalty upon finding that a national consensus had formed against it); Atkins v.
Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316, 321 (2002) (invalidating death penalty for mentally retarded
offenders upon same finding); Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 370-73 (1989) (upholding juvenile death penalty upon finding of insufficient evidence of a national consensus
against it), abrograted by, Roper, supra; Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 334-35 (1989)
(upholding death penalty for mentally retarded offenders upon same finding), abrogated by
Adkins, supra.
7. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 564 ("The beginning point [of analysis] is a review of
objective indicia of consensus, as expressed in particular by the enactments of legislatures
that have addressed the question."); accord Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314-16, 321-23; Stanford, 492
U.S. at 370-73; Penry, 492 U.S. at 331, 334-35. The Justices also consider jury sentencing
data, see Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 (1977) ('"[T]he jury ... is a significant and
reliable objective index of contemporary values because it is so directly involved."') (quoting
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 181 (1976)), and reserve the right to use their own judgment
as to whether a punishment violates the "cruel and unusual punishments" clause. See Coker,
433 U.S. at 597 ("[T]he Constitution contemplates that in the end our own judgment will be
brought to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty under the Eighth
Amendment"); accord Roper, 543 U.S. at 564; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 312.
8. Penry, 492 U.S. at 331; accord Stanford, 492 U.S. at 370; McCleskey v. Kemp,
481 U.S. 279, 300 (1987); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173-76.
9. Conventional wisdom is that the Court only takes an explicitly majoritarian
approach in the Eighth Amendment context because the text of the "cruel and unusual punishments" clause arguably demands it. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Second Amendment
Minima/ism: Heller as Griswold, 122 HARV. L. REv. 246,266 & n.125 (2008) ("[I]t is unusual for the Court to acknowledge the relevance of the national consensus," noting in accompanying footnote that "[t]he Court occasionally does refer to such a consensus in the
Eighth Amendment context, ... but the word 'unusual' in the amendment provides a textual
hook for that approach in these cases"); Kermit Roosevelt III, Polyphonic Stare Decisis:
Listening to Non-Article Ill Actors, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1303, 1331 (2008) (arguing that
constitutional norms are influenced by the prevailing social climate and that in some cases,
"perhaps limited to the Eighth Amendment," the unusualness of a practice should itself be
reason to reconsider precedents in light of a new state of affairs); James W. Ellis, Disability
Advocacy and the Death Penalty: The Road From Penry to Atkins, 33 N.M. L. REv. 173, 178
(2003) ("But while the Court, in interpreting other parts of the Constitution, occasionally
observes that a particular state's statute is unique or unusual, it is only in the context of the
Punishments Clause of the Eighth Amendment that such comparisons are given doctrinal
significance. This unique feature of Eighth Amendment jurisprudence derives, of course,
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discuss below (and have discussed in greater detail elsewhere), 10 the Supreme Court counts states to identify and apply constitutional norms in a
host of other doctrinal areas too.
To the limited extent scholars have recognized state counting as a doctrinal phenomenon outside the Eighth Amendment, they have done so in the
substantive due process context. 11 Given the Supreme Court's fundamental
rights jurisprudence, this comes as no surprise. When identifying whether a
substantive due process claim involves a fundamental right, the Justices ask
whether the asserted right is "deeply rooted in this nation's history and tradition," relying on the position taken by state legislatures as "crucial 'guideposts for responsible decisionmaking"' and "[t]he primary and most reliable indication of ... consensus." 12 The latter phrase, as one might surmise,
comes straight from the Court's Eighth Amendment cases, 13 and results in
the same sort of state nose-counting that the Justices engage in when deciding cases under the "cruel and unusual punishment" clause. 14 In both confrom the text's prohibition on the infliction of 'cruel and unusual punishments."'). See also
Penry, 492 U.S. at 351 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("If [a punishment] is not unusual, that is, if an
objective examination of the laws and jury determinations fails to demonstrate society's
disapproval of it, the punishment is not unconstitutional even if out of accord with the theories of penology favored by the Justices of this Court.").
I 0. Part I of this Essay draws upon a more elaborate articulation of the point I have
made elsewhere. See Corinna Barrett Lain, The Unexceptiona/ism of "Evolving Standards,"
57 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 365 (2009).
II. See, e.g., Daniel 0. Conkle, Three Theories of Substantive Due Process, 85 N.C.
L. REV. 63, 124-33 (2006) (recognizing implicit doctrine of "evolving national values" in
Supreme Court's most recent substantive due process cases, and pointing to Eighth Amendment "evolving standards" doctrine as precedent and guidance for developing the doctrine);
Michael W. McConnell, Tradition and Constitutionalism Before the Constitution, 1998 U.
ILL. L. REV. 173, 174 (noting that while constitutional theory has been dominated by originalist and moral reasoning approaches, in practice a third approach has appeared--one
grounded on "the gradually evolving moral principles of the nation" and exemplified by the
Court's most recent substantive due process decisions); Benjamin J. Roesch, Crowd Control:
The Majoritarian Court and the Reflection of Public Opinion in Doctrine, 39 SUFFOLK U. L.
REV. 379, 382 (2006) (noting "striking similarities" between substantive due process analysis
in recent cases and Eighth Amendment "evolving standards" analysis, and absence of similar
doctrinal developments elsewhere); Tom Stacy, Cleaning Up the Eighth Amendment Mess,
14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 475,496 (2005) (noting that at times, "the Court has appealed
to majoritarian judgments as defining the scope of fundamental substantive due process
rights"); Robert F. Nagel, Disagreement and Interpretation, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 11,
19 (1993) (recognizing role of state legislation in the use of "tradition" to define due process
rights).
12. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 711,721 (1997).
13. See id at 711 (quoting Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 373 (1989))
('"[T]he primary and most reliable indication of a [national] consensus is ... the pattern of
enacted laws."'). See also supra note 8 and accompanying text (quoting a similar articulation of the point in the Eighth Amendment context).
14. See Lain, supra note 10, at 372-73 (comparing the Supreme Court's analysis in
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), which invalidated the juvenile death penalty under
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texts, the Court's analysis focuses heavily on the state legislative landscape,
considering current statutes, legislative trends, and under-enforcement
among those statutes allowing the challenged practice to remain. 15
It is tempting to dismiss the Supreme Court's state-counting exercises
in the substantive due process context as a function of the doctrine's textually paradoxical, and thus entirely unbounded, nature. 16 The Justices need
something upon which to hang their hats in this area; they have said as
much themselves. 17 But even on the process side of due process, the Supreme Court commonly determines constitutional protection based on
whether a majority of the states agrees with it. Three procedural due
process doctrines illustrate the point.
First is the Supreme Court's doctrine for identifying fundamental procedures. Just as the Due Process Clause protects certain substantive rights
because they are considered fundamental, it also protects certain procedural
rights because they are considered fundamental. 18 As one might have
guessed, the standard used to determine whether a procedural right is fundamental is the same as the Court uses in the substantive due process context: the right must be "so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental." 19 Here too, the Court relies on state

the Eighth Amendment, with Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), which invalidated
statutes criminalizing same-sex sodomy under the Due Process Clause).
15. See id. (comparing Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571-73, with Roper, 543 U.S. at 56467).
16. The notion that the due process clause would protect something other than
process is, as John Hart Ely famously wrote, "a contradiction in terms-sort of like 'green
pastel redness."' JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 18 (1980).
17. See, e.g., Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115,125 (1992) ("As a
general matter, the Court has always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due
process because guideposts for responsible decisionmaking in this unchartered area are
scarce and open-ended."); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 194 (1986) ("Nor are we
inclined to take a more expansive view of our authority to discover new fundamental rights
imbedded in the Due Process Clause. The Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to
illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable
roots in the language or design of the Constitution."); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494, 502 (1977) ("Substantive due process has at times been a treacherous field for this
Court. There are risks when the judicial branch gives enhanced protection to certain substantive liberties without the guidance of the more specific provisions of the Bill of Rights...
. That history counsels caution and restraint.").
18. See infra notes 19-20 (citing cases applying principle).
19. See, e.g., Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934); accordDist. Att'y's
Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 129 S. Ct. 2308, 2332 (2009); Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437,449 (1992); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 523 (1958). Indeed, some
of the Court's substantive due process decisions use this articulation of the standard as well.
See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 593 (2003); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 72021 (1997).
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legislative consensus as its guide. 20 According to the Supreme Court, practices "are unlikely to endure for long, or to retain wide acceptance, if they
are at odds with notions of fairness and rationality sufficiently fundamental
to be comprehended in due process."21 Simply put, if a procedure was really inconsistent with due process, most states would not be using it.
A second example of the Supreme Court's explicitly majoritarian approach to procedural due process protection is in the area of notice and opportunity to be heard. Here one can see a different way in which majority
will explicitly shapes the contours of constitutional protection: by guiding
the application, as opposed to identification, of a constitutional norm. In
this area, the Justices employ an interest-balancing analysis to identify what
the Due Process Clause requires, balancing the government's interest in the
challenged procedure against the private interests at stake and the likelihood
that a different procedure would lessen the risk of an erroneous deprivation.22 On its face, nothing about the Court's articulation of the constitutional norm is explicitly majoritarian. Yet, as applied, the Court's cases in
this area commonly employ state counting as a means of determining constitutional protection. Sometimes the Court uses the fact that most states
have adopted similar procedures as evidence of the importance of the government interest at stake. 23 Sometimes the Court uses the fact that most
states have not adopted similar procedures as evidence of the lack of an
20. See, e.g., Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 640 (1991) (counting states to decide
procedural due process challenge to a state's definition of a crime, emphasizing "the importance of history and widely shared practice as concrete indicators of what fundamental fairness and rationality require"); Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 748-52 (counting states to
decide procedural due process challenge to a state's definition of insanity); Montana v.
Egelhoff, 518 U.S. 37, 46-49, 51 (1996) (counting states to decide procedural due process
challenge to a state's exclusion of evidence on the issue of the defendant's mental state);
Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 267-68 (1984) (counting states to decide procedural due
process challenge to pretrial detention of juveniles).
21. Schad, 501 U.S. at 642.
22. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
23. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 60 n.17 (1987) (rejecting due
process claim to notice of the contents of a child abuse report in a sexual assault case, reasoning that "[t]he importance of the public interest at issue in this case is evidenced by the fact
that all 50 States and the District of Columbia have statutes that protect the confidentiality of
their official records concerning child abuse"); Williams v. Florida 399 U.S. 78, 81-82
(1970) (justifying notice of alibi requirement based on the importance of state interest at
stake, reasoning that "the State's interest in protecting itself against an eleventh-hour defense
is both obvious and legitimate. Reflecting this interest, notice-of-alibi provisions, dating at
least from 1927, are now in existence in a substantial number of States") (internal citation
omitted); see also Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 267-68 (1984) (justifying pretrial detention
of juveniles based on the importance of state interest at stake, surveying states and reasoning
that "[i]n light of the uniform legislative judgment that pretrial detention of juveniles properly promotes the interests both of society and the juvenile, we conclude that the practice
serves a legitimate regulatory purpose compatible with the 'fundamental fairness' demanded
by the Due Process Clause in juvenile proceedings").
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important government interest at stake. 24 And sometimes the Court uses the
fact that most states have, or have not, adopted similar procedures to assess
the risk of erroneous deprivation associated with a challenged procedure. 25
Whatever the avenue, the result is the same: constitutional protection that
turns on whether a majority of states agree with it.
Yet a third example of the Supreme Court's explicitly majoritarian approach to procedural due process protection is the Court's jurisprudence on
burdens of proof. In this area, the Court has explained:
A legislative judgment that is not only consistent with the 'dominant opinion'
throughout the country but is also in accord with 'the traditions of our people and
our law,' is entitled to a powerful presumption of validity when it is challenged
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The converse of this
proposition is that a principal reason for any constitutionally mandated departure
24. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Doehr, 501 U.S. I, 3-4 (1991) (rejecting the state's
interest in challenged procedure and relying on the fact that "nearly every State requires
either a preattachment hearing, a showing of some exigent circumstance, or both, before
permitting an attachment to take place," attaching an appendix to its opinion categorizing the
statutes along five different axes); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 78-79 (1985) ("Oklahoma
asserts that to provide Ake with psychiatric assistance on the record before us would result in
a staggering burden to the State.... We are unpersuaded by this assertion. Many States, as
well as the Federal Government, currently make psychiatric assistance available to indigent
defendants, and they have not found the financial burden so great as to preclude this assistance .... We therefore conclude that the governmental interest in denying Ake the assistance of a psychiatrist is not substantial."); Little v. Streater, 452 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1981) (finding a due process violation where state forced indigent defendants to pay for cost of paternity
test, reasoning: "Moreover, following the example of other states, the expense of blood
grouping tests for an indigent defendant in a Connecticut paternity suit could be advanced by
the state and then taxed as costs to the parties .... We must conclude that the State's monetary interest 'is hardly significant enough to overcome private interests as important as those
here"' (quoting Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 28 (1981)); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,484, 488 n.l5 (1972) (finding a due process violation where state revoked
parole without a hearing, reasoning that "most States have recognized that there is no interest
on the part of the State in revoking parole without any procedural guarantees at all" and
stating in a footnote that "[v]ery few States provide no hearing at all in parole revocations.
Thirty States provide in their statutes that a parolee shall receive some type of hearing").
25. See, e.g., Ake, 470 U.S. at 79-80 ("Last, we inquire into the probable value of
the psychiatric assistance sought, and the risk of error in the proceeding if such assistance is
not offered. We begin by considering the pivotal role that psychiatry has come to play in
criminal proceedings. More than 40 states, as well as the Federal Government, have decided
either through legislation or judicial decision that indigent defendants are entitled, under
certain circumstances, to the assistance of a psychiatrist's expertise .... These statutes and
court decisions reflect a reality that we recognize today, namely, that when the State has
made the defendant's mental condition relevant to his criminal culpability and to the punishment he might suffer, the assistance of a psychiatrist may well be crucial to the defendant's ability to marshal his defense."); Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 612 (1979) (rejecting a
due process challenge to a state's truncated procedure for committing juveniles to state mental hospitals, reasoning, "[t]hat there may be risks of error in the process affords no rational
predicate for holding unconstitutional an entire statutory and administrative scheme that is
generally followed in more than 30 states").
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from the preponderance standard has been the adoption of a more exacting burden
of proof by the majority of jurisdictions?6

Applying this principle, the Supreme Court has counted states when deciding a number of constitutional questions regarding burdens of proof.27 According to the Court, state legislative consensus reflects "a profound judgment about the way in which law should be enforced and justice administered."28
Outside the due process context, the Supreme Court uses the majority
position of the states to guide its decisionmaking as well. One can even find
this phenomenon in areas famous for countermajoritarian decisionmaking,
like the Equal Protection Clause and the First Amendment. 29 In the equal
protection area, for example, courts first must determine whether the challenged classification burdens a fundamental right, suspect class, or quasisuspect class, then must apply the appropriate level of scrutiny to determine
whether the relationship between the classification and the government interest supporting it is sufficient. 30 Like the notice and opportunity to be
26. Rivera v. Minnich, 483 U.S. 574, 578 (1987) (quoting Lochner v. New York,
198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting)) (citations omitted).
27. See, e.g., In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361-62 (1970) (counting states when
rejecting preponderance of evidence standard in criminal proceedings); Addington v. Texas,
441 U.S. 418, 426 (1979) (counting states when rejecting preponderance of evidence standard in civil commitment proceedings); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 749 & n.3 (1997)
(counting states when rejecting preponderance of evidence standard in termination of parental rights proceedings); Cruzan v. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 284 (1990) (counting
states to decide burden of proof question related to surrogate medical decisions); Cooper v.
Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 360-62 (1996) (counting states to decide burden of proof question
related to a criminal defendant's competency); Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 447-48
(1992) (same); Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 478 (2000) (counting states to decide
burden of proof question related to sentencing enhancements); Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S.
684, 696 (1975) (counting states to decide burden of proof question related to criminal intent).
28. In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 361-62 (quoting Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,
155 (1968)); accord Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 478; Rivera, 483 U.S. at 578-79.
29. See Friedman, supra note 2, at 604 n.135 ("In the First Amendment context,
second perhaps only to small parts of equal protection jurisprudence, the Court most unabashedly seems to take on the majority in the name of minority rights."). For cases famous for
countermajoritarian decisionmaking, see, for example, Brown v. Bd. ofEduc., 347 U.S. 483,
483 (1954) (invalidating racially segregated schools under the Equal Protection Clause);
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 421 (1962) (invalidating school prayer under the First
Amendment); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 397 (1989) (invalidating a state's proscription
on flag burning under the First Amendment).
30. If the classification burdens a fundamental right or suspect class, it must be
narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest. If the classification burdens a quasi-suspect
class, it must be substantially related to an important government interest. And if the classification does neither, it need only be rationally related to a legitimate government interest.
See (ironically) Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) ("It should be noted,
to begin with, that all legal restrictions which curtail the civil rights of a single racial group
are immediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It
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heard cases, the Court's equal protection cases show the Justices following
the majority position of the states when applying the constitutional norm,
rather than when identifying it in the first place. In some cases, the Court
relies upon the majority position of the states to validate a classificationY
According to the Court, the fact that most states employ a classification
suggests that there is a "commonsense distinction" along the lines that the
classification has drawn. 32 In other cases, the Court has relied on a classification's outlier status to strike it down, cautioning that '"(d]iscriminations
of an unusual character"' be carefully scrutinized, even under rational basis
review. 33
The Supreme Court's First Amendment cases provide a similar example, but here, the majority position of the states matters in at least two ways.
is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny."); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190, 197 (I 976) (articulating the intermediate scrutiny standard); Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S.
312, 319-21 (1993) (discussing the rational basis standard). See also JOHN E. NowAK &
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 687-88 (7th ed. 2004) (discussing all three
standards and their application to classifications based on race, national origin, gender and
illegitimacy).
31. See, e.g., Heller, 509 U.S at 327, 333 (rejecting an equal protection challenge to
classification that treated mentally retarded and mentally ill persons differently, relying in
part on the fact that "[a] large majority of states have separate involuntary commitment laws
for the two groups"); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. I, 47-48
(I 973) ("The District Court found that the State had failed even 'to establish a reasonable
basis' for a system that results in different levels of per-pupil expenditure. We disagree. In
its reliance on state as well as local resources, the Texas system is comparable to the systems
employed in virtually every other State." (citation omitted)); Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793,
804-05 (1997) (rejecting an equal protection challenge to a state's ban on assisted suicide,
relying on the fact that "the overwhelming majority of state legislatures have drawn a clear
line between assisting suicide and withdrawing or permitting the refusal of unwanted lifesaving medical treatment"); Holt Civic Club v. City of Tuscaloosa, 439 U.S. 60, 72 (I 978) (rejecting an equal protection challenge to the state's creation of political subdivisions, explaining, "[i]n this country 35 States authorize their municipal subdivisions to exercise governmental powers beyond their corporate limits"); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404-05 (1975)
(rejecting an equal protection challenge to a residency requirement for divorce, reasoning
that "[t]he imposition of a durational residency requirement for divorce is scarcely unique to
Iowa, since 48 States impose such a requirement as a condition for maintaining an action for
divorce"); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 583 (1964) ("Decennial reapportionment appears
to be a rational approach to readjustment of legislative representation in order to take into
account population shifts and growth. Reallocation of legislative seats every 10 years coincides with the prescribed practice in 41 of the States.").
32. Heller, 509 U.S. at 326.
33. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 633 (1996); see, e.g., Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666 n.4 (I 966) (invalidating a poll tax under the Equal Protection
Clause, noting that "[o]nly a handful of States today condition the franchise on the payment
of a poll tax"); Craig, 429 U.S. at 208 n.22 (invalidating gender distinctions in state regulation of sale of alcohol, stating, "[t]he repeal of most of these laws signals society's perception of the unfairness and questionable constitutionality of singling out groups to bear the
brunt of alcohol regulation"); id. at 212 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Apparently Oklahoma
is the only State to permit this narrow discrimination to survive ....").
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In the freedom of religion context, the Court counts states when scrutinizing
the sufficiency of the government interest supporting a challenged practice
and the legitimacy of the means used to serve it, just as it does in the equal
protection context. 34 Here again, the more common the practice, the more
likely it is to pass constitutional muster, and vice versa. 35 In the freedom of
speech context, the Court does the same thing, 36 but it also counts states to
determine whether First Amendment protection is available as a threshold
matter. According to the Court, certain categories of speech are outside the
ambit of First Amendment protection altogether. 37 To identify those categories, the Court frequently relies on the majority position of the states, refus-

34. See, e.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 435 (1961) (upholding Sunday
closing laws, stating, "[a]Imost every state in our country presently has some type of Sunday
regulation and over forty possess a relatively comprehensive system"); Walz v. Tax Comm'n
of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 676 (1970) (upholding a state tax exemption for realty owned for
religious purposes, stating, "[a]ll of the 50 States provide for tax exemption of places of
worship, most of them doing so by constitutional guarantees .... Few concepts are more
deeply embedded in the fabric of our national life"); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 78889, 794 (1983) (upholding the state practice of opening a legislative session with a prayer by
a chaplain paid from public funds, noting that the practice has "been followed consistently in
most of the states" and that "many state legislatures and the United States Congress provide
compensation for their chaplains"); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 625 (1978) (invalidat. ing a state provision barring ministers from serving as delegates, noting that "[t]oday Tennessee remains the only State excluding ministers from certain public offices"); Bd. of Educ.
ofKiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 701 (1994) (invalidating a school
district that tracked denominational lines, noting that it was "exceptional to the point of singularity").
35. See id.
36. See, e.g., Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 353, 370
(1997) (upholding a ban on so-called "fusion" candidates under interest balancing test, beginning opinion with the statement: "Most States prohibit multiple-party, or 'fusion,' candidacies for elected office" and concluding that "the Constitution does not require Minnesota,
and the approximately 40 other States that do not permit fusion, to allow it"); Barnes v. Glen
Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 568 (1991) (upholding a public indecency statute under interest
balancing test, noting that "[p]ublic indecency statutes of this sort are of ancient origin and
presently exist in at least 47 States"); Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208,
223 n.l2 ( 1986) (invalidating a closed primary statute under an interest balancing test, noting
"that appellant's direst predictions about destruction of the integrity of the election process
and decay of responsible party government are not borne out by the experience of the 29
States which have chosen to permit more substantial openness in their primary systems than
Connecticut has permitted heretofore"); Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S.
490, 510 (1981) (upholding a billboard regulation under an interest balancing test, noting that
"the [legislative] judgment involved here is not so unusual as to raise suspicions in itself'
and that the regulation at issue was "like many States").
37. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,571-72 (1942) ("There are certain
well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which
has never been thought to raise any Constitutional problem."); accord Virginia v. Black, 538
U.S. 343, 358 (2003); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,485 (1957).
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ing to recognize constitutional protection where the states have declined to
extend protection on their own. 38
Finally, one can see the Supreme Court taking an explicitly majoritarian approach to constitutional protection in the criminal context. When
interpreting the Fourth Amendment's prohibition against "unreasonable
searches and seizures," for example, the Court looks for a "clear consensus
among the States."39 According to the Court,
A longstanding, widespread practice is not immune from constitutional scrutiny.
But neither is it to be lightly brushed aside. This is particularly so when the constitutional standard is as amorphous as the word "reasonable," and when custom and
contemporary norms necessarily play such a large role in the constitutional analysis.40

Applying these principles, the Court has counted states when resolving a
number of key Fourth Amendment issues. 41 On each of these occasions,
what struck the Court as "reasonable" was what a majority of state legislatures considered the term to mean.
The Supreme Court's Sixth Amendment cases on the right to a jury
trial provide yet another example. For over seventy years now, the Court
has relied on "objective standards such as may be observed in the laws and
practices of the community" to guide its determination of which jury prac-

38. See, e.g., Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 255 (1952) (excluding libel from
First Amendment protection while recognizing that "[t]oday, every American jurisdictionthe forty-eight States, the District of Columbia, Alaska, Hawaii and Puerto Rico--punish
[sic] libels directed at individuals"); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757-58 (1982) (excluding child pornography from First Amendment protection and providing detailed breakdown of similar state statutes); Roth, 354 U.S. at 485 (excluding obscenity from First
Amendment protection, noting "the universal judgment that obscenity should be restrained,
reflected in the international agreement of over 50 nations, in the obscenity laws of all of the
48 States, and in the 20 obscenity laws enacted by the Congress from 1842 to 1956").
39. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590-603 (1980).
40. !d. at 600.
41. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1985) (counting states to
determine when a police officer has used excessive force, noting that "[i]n evaluating the
reasonableness of police procedures under the Fourth Amendment, we have also looked to
prevailing rules in individual jurisdictions"); Payton, 455 U.S. at 600 (prohibiting warrantless arrest in the home, stating, "[o]nly 24 of the 50 States currently sanction warrantless
entries into the home to arrest, and there is an obvious declining trend. Further, the strength
of the trend is greater than the numbers alone indicate" (citations omitted)); United States v.
Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 421-22 (1976) (recognizing the validity of warrantless arrest in public, stating, "[t]he balance struck by the common law in generally authorizing felony arrests
on probable cause, but without a warrant, has survived substantially intact. It appears in
almost all of the States in the form of express statutory authorization"); Atwater v. City of
Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 320, 344 (2001) (upholding arrest for nonjailable offense, stating,
"today statutes in all 50 States and the District of Columbia permit warrantless misdemeanor
arrests by at least some (if not all) peace officers without requiring any breach of the peace,
as do a host of congressional enactments," and attaching appendix).
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tices are constitutionally required and which are not, 42 stressing the importance of "objective criteria, chiefly the existing laws and practice of the Nation" in its Sixth Amendment analysis. 43 Here, as elsewhere, the Court's
approach is patently majoritarian, surveying the states and then following
the national norm. 44
In sum, the Supreme Court takes an explicitly majoritarian approach
to constitutional protection across a variety of doctrinal contexts, consciously considering-and then constitutionalizing-the majority position of the
states. Friedman is right; Supreme Court decisionmaking is inextricably
bound to majority will, and in The Will of the People, he proves the point
brilliantly. But the story Friedman tells would have been richer had it not
overlooked the most provocative, and powerful, evidence of the Court's
majoritarian proclivities: its widespread use of explicitly majoritarian doctrine. Through explicitly majoritarian doctrine, the Justices admit to doing
what Friedman works so hard to prove. Indeed, they prove the point better,
for they tell us that following the will of the people is what they are trying
to do. The question then becomes why, as a doctrinal matter, the Justices
might find such an approach' to constitutional protection attractive.
II. EXPLAINING EXPLICITLY MAJORITARIAN DOCTRINE

In The Will of the People, Friedman provides a compelling account of
the reasons for the Supreme Court's majoritarian proclivities-an account
that, as Friedman rightly recognizes, is "remarkably impoverished" in current scholarship. 45 But here too, Friedman's explanation is entirely extralegal. He discusses the majoritarian influence of the judicial appointments
process. 46 He discusses the majoritarian influence of Justices who want to
be liked. 47 He discusses the majoritarian influence of the Court's median,

42. Dist. of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617,628 (1937).
43. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 161 (1968).
44. See, e.g., Burch v. Louisiana, 441 U.S. 130, 138 (1979) (invalidating nonunanimous six-member juries and stating, "[i]t appears that of those States that utilize sixmember juries in trials of nonpetty offenses, only two, including Louisiana, also allow nonunanimous verdicts. We think that this near-uniform judgment of the Nation provides a
useful guide in delimiting the line between those jury practices that are constitutionally permissible and those that are not"); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 70 (1970) (quoting
Duncan, 391 U.S. at 161) (rejecting state's proposed analysis to determine when a sentence
was sufficiently severe to trigger the right to jury, stating, "[a] better guide '[i]n determining
whether the length of the authorized prison term or the seriousness of other punishment is
enough in itself to require a jury trial' is disclosed by 'the existing laws and practices in the
Nation."').
45. FRIEDMAN, supra note I, at 373.
46. See id. at 374.
47. See id.
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swing voters. 48 And most of all, he discusses the majoritarian influence of
various court-curbing techniques, arguing that the Justices are somewhat
stuck issuing majoritarian rulings because bad things will happen if they
don't. 49 While each of these explanations is important, here too, Friedman's
account would have been richer had he considered a doctrinal explanation
for the influence of majority will.
I am not the first to point out the Constitution's indeterminate text, but
a doctrinal explanation of the Supreme Court's majoritarian proclivities
requires starting here. Most constitutional liberties are not self-defining.
What is unreasonable in the search and seizure context? What process is
due? The Constitution is written in broad, malleable terms; it takes value
judgments to give those terms meaning. 50 This is true even for seemingly
clear constitutional commands. The Equal Protection Clause, for example,
requires that like persons be treated alike, but underlying the surface simplicity of that command are difficult questions about what differences matter and when, and they have no ready answers. 51 The First Amendment, to
take another example, begins with the words "Congress shall make no
law"52 but its freedoms of religion and speech have never been absolute. 53
For any enumerated protection, judgment calls must be made 54-and they
have to come from somewhere. As I see it, the Court has three main choices.
One is originalism. The chief benefit of relying on original intent to
draw the contours of constitutional protection is that it cabins judicial discretion (at least according to originalists). 55 While this may or may not be
48. See id. at 375.
49. Seeid.at375-76.
50. See LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW I 452 (Foundation
Press 3d ed. 2000) ("There is simply no way for courts to review legislation in terms of the
Constitution without repeatedly making difficult substantive choices among competing values .... ").
51. See generally Peter Westen, The Empty Idea of Equality, 95 HARV. L. REv. 537
(1982) (arguing that equality is an "empty idea" on its own, a command that means nothing
absent the values used to fill it).
52. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press .... ").
53. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
54. Erwin Chemerinsky may have put the point best when he wrote, "The Court can
be criticized for the choices it makes but not for making choices." Erwin Chemerinsky, The
Supreme Court 1988 Term-Forward: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REv. 43,
101 (1989); see also supra note 50 (recognizing value judgments inherently implicated in
constitutional decisionmaking).
55. See Randy E. Barnett, Was the Right To Keep and Bear Arms Conditioned on
Service in an Organized Militia?, 83 TEX. L. REv. 237, 240 (2004) (book review) ("Those
originalists who favor original intent want to fill the gaps in the original public meaning and
cabin the discretion of those engaged in construction of abstract provisions by appealing to
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true, the downside of an originalist approach is dead hand rule: why should
today's majorities be governed by what majorities thought two hundred
years ago? The Court can ask the framers (who may or may not have
thought about the issue, and who may or may not have supported originalism in the first place), 56 but the fact of the matter is that the framers are long
dead, so using their views, even if ascertainable, merely exacerbates the
already undemocratic nature of judicial review.
A second source of values is the Justices' own judgment. Indeed,
even when the Supreme Court counts states in its constitutional decisionmaking, it sometimes reserves the right to use its "independent judgment" to
go the other way. 57 The danger here is just what originalism aims to prevent: the Court's unbridled ability to decide any given case any way it
wants. This is the core of the countermajoritarian difficulty-the fact that
nine unelected judges (five, really) can impose their judgments on democratic majorities in a land ostensibly governed by majority rule. 58
That leaves the third option, prevailing contemporary norms. Like the
first two, this option is not perfect. While it avoids the undemocratic tendencies of the other approaches, a consensus-based approach to constitutional decisionmaking has a problem of its own. As John Hart Ely put the
point, "it makes no sense to employ the value judgments of the majority as
the vehicle for protecting minorities from the value judgments of the majority."59 That said, when the Justices count states to decide what is reasonable,
what process is due-whether the state interest supporting a challenged
practice is sufficiently important-their approach is not all that different
from what the rest of us do when grappling with value-laden questions that
have no obviously right or wrong answer. We look around, see what everybody else is doing, ask our friends. We search for evidence of a norm.
However perverse the notion of explicitly majoritarian constitutional protecthe specific intentions of those who either wrote or ratified them."); see also ANTONIN
SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW vii (1997) ("Originalism helps specify "textualism" and helps judges arrive at definite interpretations of the
text even when the words are ambiguous.").
56. See Michael Klarman, What's So Great About Constitutionalism?, 93 Nw. U. L.
REV. 145, 147-48 (I 998) (noting a "plentitude of subjects not contemplated by the Framers");
H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. R. 885
(1985) (arguing that the Framers did not intend originalism as a means of constitutional
interpretation).
57. See, e.g., Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624, 642 (1991) (noting in due process
context, "[t]his is not to say that either history or current practice is dispositive"); see also
supra note 7 (noting similar disclaimer in the Eighth Amendment context).
58. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16-17 (1962) ("[J]udicial review is a counter-majoritarian
force in our system .... [W]hen the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a legislative act
... it thwarts the will of the representatives of the actual people of the here and now.").
59. ELY, supra note 16, at 69.
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tion may be in theory, it is not difficult to see why the Justices count states
(and they all do). 6° Constitutional interpretation involves judgment calls,
and state counting provides an objective, contemporary measure of how
those calls should be made. The Justices have said as much themselves. 61
Ill. RETURNING TO THE EXTERNAL VIEW

Thus far, I have aimed to complement The Will of the People by providing a doctrinal account of the influence of majority will. In this final
Part, I return to the essence of Friedman's claim, taking a nondoctrinallook
at explicitly majoritarian doctrine. The insight that emerges reinforces the
external view--even the Supreme Court's state counting exercises are susceptible to the influence of larger, extralegal, social and political forces.
The Court's flip-flop rulings on the death penalty for mentally retarded and
juvenile offenders provide prime examples.
On the same day in 1989, the Supreme Court issued two landmark
death penalty rulings: Penry v. Lynaugh62 and Stanford v. Kentucky. 63 In
Penry, the Court rejected the claim that the Eighth Amendment's "cruel and
unusual punishments" clause prohibited the death penalty for mentally retarded offenders,64 while in Stanford, the Court rejected the same claim for
juvenile offenders. 65 In both cases, the Justices held that a "national consensus" had not yet formed against the challenged practice based on a survey of
state legislatures. 66
Despite their similarities, Penry and Stanford posed dramatically different doctrinal applications. On the merits, Penry was an easy case for the
Supreme Court; only two states barred the execution of mentally retarded
offenders. 67 Stanford was much harder. In 1989, twelve of the thirty-seven
death penalty states had no juvenile death penalty, while the remaining
twenty-five states allowed it.68 That made the ruling in Stanford look
straightforward-over half the death penalty states supported the sanctionbut the numbers were not that simple. In prior cases, the Court had also
60. See Lain, supra note 10, at 409-12 (discussing state counting among the Supreme Court's conservatives, moderates, and liberals, and explaining why each ideological
type might find state polling attractive).
61. See supra notes 8, 12-13, 43 and accompanying text.
62. 492 U.S. 302 (1989), abrogated by Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
63. 492 U.S. 361 (1989), abrogated by Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
64. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 328-40.
65. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 380. Technically, the Supreme Court in Stanford was
only considering the death penalty for sixteen- and seventeen-year-old offenders, see id., as it
had already invalidated the death penalty for juveniles age fifteen and younger the previous
year. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 838 (1988).
66. See supra note 6.
67. See Penry, 492 U.S. at 334.
68. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 370.
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considered non-death penalty jurisdictions in its state counting exercises, 69
which, as Stanford's dissenters pointed out, would have significantly
changed the calculus. 70 If the twelve death penalty states that exempted
juvenile offenders were added to the thirteen non-death penalty states and
the District of Columbia (also a non-death penalty jurisdiction), then the
number of jurisdictions rejecting the juvenile death penalty became twentysix-a slight majority. 71 If one also included Vermont, whose death penalty
had been invalidated in 1972 but never legislatively rescinded or amended,
the number became twenty-seven. 72 If one included other states-and there
were various reasons to do s~the numbers inched incrementally higher. 73
In the end, whether the state count supported constitutional protection was
mostly a function of whether the Justices wanted it to.
Over a decade later, the Supreme Court reconsidered its rulings in Penry and Stanford, reversing its position in both. The Court's 2002 decision
in Atkins v. Virginia invalidated the death penalty for mentally retarded offenders, 74 while its 2005 decision in Roper v. Simmons invalidated the death
penalty for juvenile offenders. 75 By sheer happenstance, the number of
states prohibiting the death penalty for mentally retarded and juvenile offenders in Atkins and Roper was the same: eighteen of the thirty-eight death
penalty states. 76 To arrive at a national consensus, the Court added the
number of death penalty states prohibiting the challenged practice to the
twelve states that had no death penalty at all. 77
On the merits, neither the Supreme Court's methodology in 1989, nor
its methodology in the post-2000 cases, was obviously right or wrong. Li69. See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 826 n.24 (1988) (plurality
opinion) ("Almost every State, and the Federal Government, has set a minimum age at which
juveniles accused of committing serious crimes can be waived from juvenile court into criminal court. The dissent's focus on the presence of these waiver ages in jurisdictions that
retain the death penalty but that have not expressly set a minimum age for the death sentence,
distorts what is truly at issue in this case." (citations omitted)).
70. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 383 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
71. See id. at 384.
72. See id. at 384 n.l.
73. See id. (noting, for example, that South Dakota has a death penalty, but has
sentenced no one to death since 1972, effectively rendering it an abolition state).
74. 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
75. 543 u.s. 551, 578-79 (2005).
76. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 564 ("When Atkins was decided, 30 States prohibited the
death penalty for the mentally retarded. This number comprised 12 that had abandoned the
death penalty altogether, and 18 that maintained it but excluded the mentally retarded from
its reach. By a similar calculation in this case, 30 States prohibit the juvenile death penalty,
comprising 12 that have rejected the death penalty altogether and 18 that maintain it but, by
express provision or judicial interpretation, exclude juveniles from its reach."). Because a
number of states had already prohibited the juvenile death penalty in 1989, the rate of change
in these two cases was different.
77. See id.
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miting the state count to death penalty jurisdictions made some amount of
sense; states that had no death penalty arguably had nothing to say about
how it should be administered in states that do. On the other hand, considering non-death penalty states also made sense; if a state had rejected the
death penalty altogether, it would presumably reject the death penalty for
mentally retarded and juvenile offenders too. The problem, in short, was
not the methodology per se. The problem was that the methodology had
changed. By 1989's standards, a national consensus still had not materialized against the death penalty for mentally retarded and juvenile offenders.
And by the Court's post-2000 standards, the Justices could have invalidated
the juvenile death penalty back in 1989. What gives?
One possibility is a change in the Supreme Court's composition. Between 1989 and 2002, four Justices retired, although due to the vagaries of
the judicial appointments process, conservatives failed to gain a seat. 78 As a
result, the delicate ideological balance on the Court remained roughly the
same, with Atkins and Roper coming out the way they did because one or
both of the Court's swing voters-Justices Kennedy and O'Connorswitched sides.79 The question then becomes what caused them to do so,
and the most plausible answer is external to the law: nondoctrinal social and
political developments made them want to.
In 1989, when the Supreme Court decided Penry and Stanford, the
larger sociopolitical context was extremely hostile to death penalty protections. Support for the death penalty while the two cases were pending was
an astonishing seventy-nine percent-the highest figure ever recorded (at
least at the time). 80 Politicians were campaigning on promises to execute
more people, faster. 81 And judicial resistance to the death penalty had be78. Between 1989 and 2002, Justices Brennan, Blackmun, White, and Marshall
retired. In theory, conservatives had a chance to gain a seat-three of the four retirees were
liberals, and President Bush had the advantage of appointing two of the replacements, not
one. But it was not to be. One of Bush's seemingly conservative appointments, Justice
Souter, in fact wasn't. See Thomas W. Merrill, The Making of the Second Rehnquist Court:
A Preliminary Analysis, 47 ST. LoUIS U. L.J. 569, 577-78 (2003) (discussing and charting the
turnover from 1986 to the mid-1990s).
79. In Atkins, both Justices O'Connor and Kennedy changed their minds, and the
vote was 6-3; thus, at least one of them was necessary for the majority. In Roper, Justice
Kennedy changed his mind, and the vote was 5-4. See supra notes 74-75.
80. See Public Support for Death Penalty is Highest in Gallup Annals, GALLUP
REPS., Jan. 1989, at 27. Support for the death penalty subsequently hit a new all-time high of
eighty percent in 1994. See David W. Moore, Americans Firmly Support Death Penalty,
THE GALLUP POLL MONTHLY, June 1995, at 23.
8l. See Andrew H. Malcolm, Society's Conflict on the Death Penalty Stalls Procession of the Condemned, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 1989, at BlO ("[A]ware of the electoral fate
last fall of Gov. Michael S. Dukakis, the Democratic Presidential nominee who opposed the
death penalty, many politicians embrace capital punishment."); Michael Oreskes, The Political Stampede on Executions, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1990, at Al6 ("From one end of the country to the other, political candidates this year are competing to persuade voters that if elected,
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come politically hazardous. 82 Support for the death penalty was part of the
same "tough on crime" mood that was gripping the country during this time,
producing mandatory minimums, three strikes legislation, and other populist
punitive measures. 83 In light of that fact, it is hard to imagine the Supreme
Court imposing significant restrictions on the death penalty in 1989-and it
didn't. The most important death penalty rulings of the mid- to late 1980s
(and there were a number of them) all went the government's way. 84
The extralegal context in which Atkins and Roper were decided, by
contrast, was dramatically different. A number of high profile death row
exonerations ignited a national debate about the death penalty in 2000, setting off a virtual explosion in support for death penalty reforms and moratoriums on executions. 85 Public support for the death penalty hit a twentyyear low,86 death sentences fell by more than fifty percent, 87 and executions
fell by almost as much-even in states like Virginia and Texas, where political commitment to capital punishment was strongest. 88 Against this backthey would be more vigorous, more vigilant and more relentless than their opponents in the
application of the death penalty."); Richard Lacayo et al., The Politics of Life and Death,
TIME, Apr. 2, 1990, at 19; see also id. (reporting campaign spokesman's statement that
"[ m]aybe the next step will be scratch-and-sniff ads, so voters can sample the smell of the
death chamber").
82. See Corinna Barrett Lain, Deciding Death, 57 DuKE L.J. 1, 38 (2007) (discussing successful 1988 campaign to defeat the retention election of California Supreme
Court Justice Rose Bird because of her decisions in death penalty cases).
83. See id. at 38-39 (discussing punitive public mood of mid- to late 1980s); Faye A.
Silas, The Death Penalty: The Comeback Picks Up Speed, 71 A.B.A. J. 43, 52 (1985)) (discussing nation's "tough on crime" mood in late 1980s and the underlying events that led to
it).
84. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297-99 (1987) (rejecting evidence
of racial discrimination in the imposition of death); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 316
(1989) (denying retroactivity for new constitutional rulings on habeas corpus); Murray v.
Giarratano, 492 U.S. I, I 0 (1989) (rejecting claim that death row inmates are entitled to right
to attorney in collateral proceedings); Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 795-96 (1987) (rejecting ineffective assistance of counsel claim in which the attorney failed to develop and present
mitigating evidence at the sentencing phase of a capital trial); Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S.
137, 157-58 (1987) (sanctioning death penalty for accomplices who neither killed nor intended to kill); Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 177 (1986) (restoring death qualification
of jurors).
85. See Lain, supra note 82, at 43-50.
86. See Frank Newport, Support for Death Penalty Drops to Lowest Level in 19
Years, Although Still High at 66%, GALLUP NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 24, 2000,
http://www.gallup.com/poll/3199/Support-Death-Penalty-Drops-Lowest-Leve1-YearsAlthough.aspx.
87. In 2004, there were 125 death sentences imposed, compared to 314 in 1994, 318
in 1995, and 320 in 1996. See James S. Liebman & Lawrence C. Marshall, Less Is Better:
Justice Stevens and the Narrowed Death Penalty, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1607, 1659-60
(2006).
88. See Brooke A. Masters, Executions Decrease for the 2nd Year; Va., Texas Show
Sharp Drops Amid a National Trend, WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 6, 2001, at AI.
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drop, death penalty practices that were controversial when support for capital punishment was high became obvious targets of reform, and executions
of mentally retarded and juvenile offenders were chief among them. By
2002, when the Supreme Court decided Atkins, even fervent death penalty
supporters no longer supported executing mentally retarded offenders. 89
And by 2005, when the Court decided Roper, the juvenile death penalty had
already pretty much died out on its own.90
In sum, the most plausible explanation for the Supreme Court's
change of heart on the death penalty for mentally retarded and juvenile offenders between 1989 and its post-2000 decisions is not doctrine-explicitly
majoritarian as it is-but the larger sociopolitical context in which these
issues were decided. Like any doctrine, the Court's state counting exercises
are subject to manipulation. The Justices decide questions of constitutional
law the way they want to, not the way they have to--and majoritarian forces
outside the law play a role in how they want to rule.
IV. CONCLUSION
Barry Friedman's The Will of the People is a masterfully written account of the influence of public opinion on Supreme Court decisionmaking.
But the argument it makes is even stronger than it looks. Sometimes the
influence of majority will is so pervasive that it seeps into the doctrinal fibers of the law itself. This is not to say that doctrine, as opposed to extralegal influences, is necessarily driving the Court's decisionmaking-even
here, extralegal forces can influence how decisions are made. But it is to
say that Friedman's account would have been richer had he incorporated
what the Supreme Court has been telling us all along. One can catch the
Justices in the act of responding to public opinion, as Friedman has convincingly done, or one can just ask them. When it comes to Supreme Court
decisionmaking, there is a doctrinal side to the influence of majority will.

89. Those supporters included President G.W. Bush and his brother Jeb, Governor
of Florida. See Raymond Bonner, President Says the Retarded Should Never Be Executed,
N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/06/12/us/president-says-theretarded-should-never-be-executed.html?pagewanted=print&src=pm; Jeb Bush Signs Bill
Barring
Executing
the
Retarded,
N.Y.
TIMES,
June
13,
2001,
http://www .nytimes.com/200 1/06/13/us/jeb-bush-signs-bill-barring-executing-theretarded.html?src=pm.
90. See VICTOR STREIB, REPORT ON THE STATUS OF THE JUVENILE DEATH PENALTY 9
(2005)) (noting that in 2001, state courts imposed just seven juvenile death sentences and
that in the two years before Roper-2003 and 2004-the annual national tally was two).

